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Abstract
This note examines how an exogenous industry-wide demand shock, such as the one re-
sulting from the use of governmental subsidies, a¤ects the exclusionary potential of learning-
by-doing. We develop a two-period duopoly model in which an increase in a rms rst-
period output leads to a decrease in its second-period marginal cost, and apply it to two
special scenarios: one in which demand and learning technologies are linear and one in
which rms are innitely impatient. In the rst scenario, we establish that a positive de-
mand shock amplies the exclusionary e¤ect of learning-by-doing if and only if rms are
su¢ ciently asymmetric in their learning abilities. In the second scenario, we emphasize the
key role of the demand curvature as a determinant of the e¤ect of a demand shock on the
exclusionary potential of learning-by-doing.
Keywords: Demand shocks, learning-by-doing, market structure, exit.
JEL codes: D11, L13, Q42
1 Introduction
This note investigates the e¤ects of industry-wide demand shocks on the well-documented
exclusionary potential of learning-by-doing (see e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988; Agliardi,
1990; Cabral and Riordan, 1994, 1997; Petrakis et al., 1997). While the existing literature
has investigated thoroughly the e¤ects of learning-by-doing on market structure, it did not
explore the way these e¤ects can be altered by demand shocks such as those resulting from
governmental subsidies. We believe that it is useful to ll this gap for two reasons. First, the
existence of learning-by-doing in some industries is often presented as a justication for the
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desirability of subsidies in those industries. Second, the use of subsidies in such industries may
have a more complex impact on market structure than in industries without learning-by-doing.
To illustrate these two reasons, consider the extensive use by several European countries
(e.g., Germany, France, Italy and Spain) of generous feed-in-tari¤s (FITs) for renewable energy
as a way to boost the demand for photovoltaic panels and wind turbines. The rationale behind
this policy has been to take advantage of learning e¤ects to drive renewablescosts to the level
of fossil fuel energy. In addition to this reason, European governments have also bet on an
industrial side-e¤ect: the promotion of national champions, or at least European champions.
However, this is not what happened: while a number of photovoltaic panel manufacturers were
European before the use of FITs, all major European rms have now exited the market. One
potential explanation is that FITs, which benet both European and non-European rms in
the current free-trade environment, may have amplied the di¤erences in e¢ ciency between
European and Asian manufacturers, in a way that drove the former out of the market.1
The model we develop in this note examines whether (and when) the exclusionary potential
of learning-by-doing is amplied by an industry-wide demand shock such as the one induced
by the use of FITs. We consider two (potentially asymmetric) rms competing à la Cournot
over two periods. Each rms second-period marginal cost depends on its rst-period output.
We examine whether a positive demand shock will increase or decrease the likelihood that one
of the two rms exits in the second period. We rst develop a general framework that allows
to identify the key variables a¤ecting the way demand shocks alter the exclusionary e¤ect
of learning-by-doing. Then, we apply this framework to two special scenarios: one in which
demand and learning technologies are linear and one in which rms are innitely impatient.
The rst scenario allows us to shed light on how the e¤ect of a positive demand shock on
the exclusionary potential of learning-by-doing depends on the (potential) asymmetry between
rms. More specically, under that scenario, we show that a positive demand shock amplies
the exclusionary potential of learning-by-doing if and only if rms are su¢ ciently asymmetric in
terms of their learning abilities. To grasp the intuition behind this nding, consider the special
case in which rms have identical rst-period marginal costs but di¤er in their learning abilities.
Then, learning-by-doing leads to di¤erent second-period marginal costs. The di¤erence between
these marginal costs is systematically amplied by a positive demand shock but this does not
always lead to an increase in the likelihood that one of the rms exits the market. The reason
for this is the following: it is not the di¤erence between the marginal costs of the two rms that
matters for the market to become a monopoly in the second period but the di¤erence between
the monopoly price of the more e¢ cient rm and the marginal cost of the less e¢ cient rm.
The second scenario allows to abstract from the intertemporal strategic e¤ects and focus on
1As shown by the photovoltaic barometer of EurObservER (https://www.eurobserv-er.org/photovoltaic-
barometer-2017/) only one European manufacturer (a German-Korean rm) is still ranked in the top 10 rms,
which includes six Chinese rms, while there were 6 European rms in the top 10 in 2008.
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how the demand shape can a¤ect the way (passive) learning-by-doing is altered by a demand
shock. We show that when the di¤erence in the curvatures of the rmsperceived rst-period
demands is su¢ ciently large then a positive demand shock will increase the output of one of the
rms and decrease the output of its rival. In that case, the shock has an unambiguous e¤ect
on the exclusionary potential of learning-by-doing: it amplies (mitigates) the exclusionary
potential of learning-by-doing by the rm whose demand curvature is lower (higher). However,
if the di¤erence between the curvatures is relatively small then a positive demand shock leads to
an increase in both rmsoutputs and, therefore, the sign of the net e¤ect on the exclusionary
potential of learning-by-doing becomes ambiguous. We show that this sign depends on the
curvature of a monopolists second period demand and the relative learning abilities of the two
rms.
2 General framework
2.1 Setup
Consider two rms A and B producing a homogeneous good and competing over two periods
t = 1; 2: Denote  the rms(common) discount factor and ci;t the (constant) marginal cost of
rm i 2 fA;Bg in period t 2 f1; 2g : Suppose that rm is learning-by-doing curve is given by
ci;2 = max(ci; fi (ci;1; qi;1))
for i = A;B, where fi (ci;1; qi;1) is di¤erentiable and decreasing in qi;1, and ci is rm is incom-
pressible marginal cost.2
Assume that the (inverse) demand is given by p1 = P1(Q1)+S in period 1 and p2 = P2(Q2)
in period 2, where Q1 = qA;1 + qB;1 and Q2 = qA;2 + qB;2: An increase in the parameter S can
be interpreted as a (rst-period) positive demand shock, which can be induced for instance by
the use of demand-side subsidies. Suppose that Pt (:) satises the following conditions:
A1 Pt(:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and decreasing whenever Pt(Qt) > 0:
A2 Pt(Qt)  ! 0 when Qt  ! +1
A3 QtP 00t (Qt) + P 0t(Qt) < 0 for all Qt  0 such that Pt(Qt) > 0.
These standard conditions ensure in particular the existence and uniqueness of the second-
period subgame equilibrium for any level of second-period marginal costs (and therefore, for
any level of rst-period productions).3 Denote Ri;1(q i;1; S) the best-response function of
rm i = A;B in the rst stage of the game when rm i correctly anticipates the second-
2This specication of the learning-by-doing process assumes away any spillovers between competitors. How-
ever, such e¤ects may exist, in particular in countries where intellectual property right protection is relatively
weak.
3See for instance Novshek (1985).
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period equilibrium, and assume that it is uniquely dened. Moreover, suppose that the two-
stage competition game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium and denote qi;t (S) rm is
equilibrium output in period t. Finally, for the sake of simplicity, assume that the parameters
of the model are such that neither rm completes its learning process at the equilibrium (i.e.,
its marginal cost remains strictly above its incompressible cost).
Let us now examine the way a positive demand shock a¤ects the exclusionary e¤ect of a
rms learning-by-doing. More precisely, we seek to understand whether an increase in the
demand parameter S makes it more or less likely that a rm exits the market in period 2.
2.2 E¤ect of a demand shock on the likelihood of exclusion
Let us rst determine under which condition a rm excludes its rival from the market in period
2. We focus hereafter on whether rm B gets excluded or not. The analysis is clearly symmetric
for rm A.
Denote pm2 (c) = P2(Q
m
2 (c)) where
Qm2 (c) = argmax
Q20
[P2(Q2)  c]Q2
which can be shown to be uniquely dened under assumptions A1-A3.
Firm B is active in the second periods equilibrium if and only if its marginal cost in that
period is below the monopoly price associated to rm As second-period marginal cost, i.e.,
pm2 (c

A;2 (S))  cB;2 (S) > 0 (1)
where
ci;2 (S) = fi
 
ci;1; q

i;1 (S)

:
To determine the e¤ect of a demand shock on the exclusionary potential of learning-by-
doing we need to study the e¤ect of a variation in S on the left-hand side (LHS) of (1). If
an increase in S leads to an increase (decrease) in the LHS, then (1) becomes less (more)
stringent, which implies that the set of parameters for which rm B is driven out of the market
in the second period shrinks (expands). This means that the exclusionary potential of rm As
learning-by-doing is mitigated (amplied) by a positive demand shock.
The derivative of the LHS of (1) can be rewritten as
d
dS
 
pm2 (c

A;2 (S))  cB;2 (S)

=
dpm2
dcA;2
@fA
@qA;1
dqA;1
dS
  @fB
@qB;1
dqB;1
dS
:
A marginal increase in S mitigates the exclusionary potential of rm As learning-by-doing if
the derivative above is positive and amplies it if it is negative. This, combined with the fact
that @fB@qB;1 < 0, leads to the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 Denote
gA (S) =  

dqA;1
dS
+
dqB;1
dS
where

 =
dpm2
dcA;2
@fA
@qA;1
@fB
@qB;1
:
Then, a positive demand shock, i.e., a marginal increase in S, amplies (mitigates) the exclu-
sionary potential of rm As learning-by-doing if gA (S) < (>) 0.
The parameter 
 can be interpreted as the learning speed of rm A relative to rm B
adjusted by the (second-period) pass-through rate. Lemma 1 shows that the e¤ect of a de-
mand shock on the exclusionary potential of rm As learning-by-doing depends on a weighted
di¤erence between the e¤ect of the shock on the outputs of the two rms, with 
 being the
relative weight on rm As output.
Let us now derive the expressions of 
,
dqA;1
dS and
dqB;1
dS , which will allow us to identify
the key primitives that a¤ect the impact of a demand shock on the exclusionary potential of
learning-by-doing. In the Appendix, we show that

 =
1
2 + Em2
@fA
@qA;1
@fB
@qB;1
; (2)
where Em2 = P
00
2 (Q
m
2 (cA;2))Q
m
2 (cA;2)=P
0
2 (Q
m(cA;2)) is the curvature of the second-period (in-
verse) demand at the monopoly output.
This shows that the parameter 
 is related to the supply side of the industry through the
rms relative performances in terms of learning-by-doing, and to the demand side through
the curvature of the demand. Note that this parameter is constant in the special case of linear
demand and learning curves.
We also establish in the Appendix that the e¤ect of a marginal increase in S is given by
dqi;1
dS
=
@Ri;1
@S +
@Ri;1
@q i;1
@R i;1
@S
1  @Ri;1@q i;1
@R i;1
@qi;1
: (3)
The term @Ri;1@S captures the direct e¤ect of an increase in S on rm is output, while the term
@Ri;1
@q i;1
@R i;1
@S captures a strategic e¤ect resulting from the reaction of rm  i to an increase
in S. Moreover, the formal analysis in the Appendix shows that the term @Ri;1@q i;1
@R i;1
@qi;1
in the
denominator captures a feedback equilibrium e¤ect.
Finally, we show in the Appendix that the direct e¤ect of an increase in S on rm is output
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is
@Ri;1
@S
=   1
P 01
1
Ei;1 + 2 +

P 01

@2i;2
@c2i;2

@fi
@qi;1
2
+
@i;2
@ci;2
@2fi
@q2i;1
 (4)
and that the slope of rm is reaction function, which is a determinant of the strategic e¤ect
discussed above, is given by
@Ri;1
@q i;1
=  
Ei;1 + 1 +

P 01
@2i;2
@ci;2@c i;2
@fi
@qi;1
@f i
@q i;1
Ei;1 + 2 +

P 01

@2i;2
@c2i;2

@fi
@qi;1
2
+
@i;2
@ci;2
@2fi
@q2i;1
 (5)
where i;2 (ci;2; c i;2) is rm is equilibrium prot in period 2 when it produces at marginal
cost ci;2 and its rival produces at marginal cost c i;2, and Ei;1 = P
00
1

Qi;1

qi;1=P
0
1

Qi;1

is
the curvature of the (inverse) demand perceived by rm i at the equilibrium.
Expressions (4) and (5) provide the necessary blocks to compute the e¤ect of the variation
in S on the rst-period equilibrium quantities using (3). These and expression (2) show which
information is needed to compute the sign of gA (S) in Lemma 1 and, therefore, the (sign of the)
e¤ect of a positive demand shock on the exclusionary potential of learning-by-doing. Given the
di¢ culty in deriving further insights within the current general framework, we now consider
two special scenarios: one in which demand and learning curves are linear and one in which
rms are innitely impatient.
3 Applications
3.1 Linear demand and learning functions
Assume that both the demand and learning functions are linear:
Pt(Qt) = at  Qt and fi (ci;1; qi;1) = ci;1   iqi;1
where at and i are positive parameters. Under this specication, it can be easily checked that
the (second-period) pass-through rate is given by dp
m
2
dcA;2
= 12 , which implies that
gA (S) =   A
2B
dqA;1
dS
+
dqB;1
dS
:
Denote
i 
2
3
p
i
for i = A;B, and assume that i < 1 to ensure the concavity of rmsmaximization program.
The parameter i is a combined measure of a rms learning ability and patience and, as shown
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by the subsequent analysis, turns out to be a su¢ cient statistic for the determination of the
sign of gA (S).
Expression (4) simplies in the current scenario to
@Ri;1
@S
=
1
2
 
1  2i

which implies that the direct e¤ect of a positive demand shock is positive, and (5) becomes
@Ri;1
@q i;1
=   1 + i i
2
 
1  2i

which implies that quantities remain strategic substitutes in the (linear) Cournot game with
(linear) learning-by-doing. In the Appendix, we show that
gA (S) < 0() B <
A
2  32A
 w (A) (6)
in the region where the equilibrium is stable, i.e., the parameter space dened by 2max
 
2A; 
2
B

+
AB < 1.
4 Note that under this condition,
w (A) < A (7)
for any A 6= 0.5 Also, notice that comparing A and B amounts to comparing A and
B. Therefore, condition (6) and inequality (7) imply that a positive demand shock can only
mitigate the exclusionary potential of a rms learning by-doing if the two rms are symmetric
or mildly asymmetric in terms of their learning abilities.6 The rms need to be su¢ ciently
asymmetric regarding their learning abilities for subsidies to amplify the exclusionary e¤ect of
its learning-by-doing. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that the demand function and the learning-by-doing technology are
linear: Pt(Qt) = at Qt and fi (ci;1; qi;1) = ci;1 iqi;1. Moreover, suppose that 2max
 
2A; 
2
B

+
AB < 1 where i = 2=3
p
i:
Then, a positive demand shock mitigates (amplies) the exclusionary potential of rm As
learning-by-doing if B > (<)w (A) where w (A) =
A
2 32A
 A.
4This inequality implies that learning-by-doing is not too fast (relatively low i) and/or rms are not too
patient (relatively low i).
5Applying the inequality 2max
 
2A; 
2
B

+ AB < 1 to A = B yields 3
2
A < 1, which implies that
w (A) < A (for A 6= 0).
6 In this linear setting, this holds regardless of the rmsinitial marginal costs.
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3.2 Innitely impatient rms
Suppose in this section that rms are innitely impatient, i.e.,  = 0. Then, from (3) and (5)
it follows that
dqi;1
dS
=   1
P 01
1
2 + Ei;1
2 1
1  @Ri;1@q i;1
@R i;1
@qi;1
 
1 + E i;1   Ei;1

where
@Ri;1
@q i;1
=  1 + E

i;1
2 + Ei;1
:
Note that @Ri;1@q i;1 2 ( 1; 0) under assumptionsA1-A3,7 which implies that quantities are strate-
gic substitutes and the equilibrium is stable. Therefore,
dqi;1
dS has the same sign as
1 + E i;1   Ei;1:
First, if EA;1   EB;1 <  1, then the asymmetry between the rms (in favor of rm A) is
so strong that the e¤ect of a positive demand shock on rm A0s output is positive while the
e¤ect on rm Bs output is negative. In this case, a positive demand shock clearly amplies
the exclusionary potential of rm As learning-by-doing.
Second, if EA;1 EB;1 > 1, then the asymmetry between the rms (in favor of rm B) is so
strong that the e¤ect of a positive demand shock on rm A0s output is negative while the e¤ect
on rm Bs output is positive. In this case, a positive demand shock mitigates the exclusionary
potential of rm As learning-by-doing.
Finally, if EA;1  EB;1 2 ( 1; 1) then the asymmetry between rms A and B is su¢ ciently
moderate for the e¤ect of a positive demand shock to be qualitatively the same for both rms
(the outputs of both rms increase). In this case, whether the demand shock amplies or
mitigates the exclusionary potential of rm As learning-by-doing depends on the comparison
between the learning-adjusted pass-through rate 
 and the relative increase in rm Bs output
with respect to rm As output, which is given by
1 

EB;1   EA;1

1 

EA;1   EB;1
 :
These ndings can be summarized in the following proposition.
7This follows from the fact that Ei;1 >  1 or, equivalently, P
00
1
 
Qi;1

qi;1+P
0
1
 
Qi;1

< 0, under assumptions
A1-A3. To see why, note rst that if P
00
1
 
Qi;1
  0, then P 001  Qi;1 qi;1+P 01  Qi;1  P 001  Qi;1Qi;1+P 01  Qi;1 <
0 where the latter inequality follows from A3. Moreover, if P
00
1
 
Qi;1

< 0 then P
00
1
 
Qi;1

qi;1 + P
0
1
 
Qi;1

<
P 01
 
Qi;1

< 0 by A1. Therefore, in both cases, Ei;1 >  1:
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Proposition 2 Assume that rms are innitely impatient (i.e., i = 0 for i = A;B). Then
the e¤ect of a positive demand shock on the exclusionary potential of rm As learning-by-doing
depends on the relative learning abilities and the curvatures of the demand functions as follows:
1. If EA;1   EB;1 <  1, then a positive demand shock amplies the exclusionary potential
of rm As learning-by-doing.
2. If EA;1 EB;1 > 1, then a positive demand shock mitigates the exclusionary potential of
rm As learning-by-doing.
3. If EA;1   EB;1 2 ( 1; 1), then a positive demand shock amplies (mitigates) the ex-
clusionary potential of rm As learning-by-doing if the learning-adjusted pass-through e¤ect
dominates (is dominated by) the relative increase of rm As output with respect to rm Bs
output, i.e.,

 > (<)
1 

EB;1   EA;1

1 

EA;1   EB;1
 :
4 Conclusion
We develop a general framework to study the e¤ect of demand shocks on the exclusionary
potential of learning-by-doing. Applying this framework to two special scenarios provides us
with two key insights. First, even if rms are asymmetric in their learning abilities, a positive
demand shock can mitigate the exclusionary e¤ect of learning-by-doing. Second, relaxing the
assumption that the demand function is linear (a standard assumption in the literature on
learning-by-doing) allows us to uncover the key role of the demand curvature as a determinant
of the e¤ect of a demand shock on the exclusionary potential of learning-by-doing. Finally, note
that demand shocks in our model can be reinterpreted as (unit) cost shocks such as supply-
side subsidies or corporate taxes. Our ndings suggest in particular that taxation can have
counterintuitive e¤ects on market structure in the presence of learning-by-doing.
5 Appendix
Computation of
dqi;1
dS . Consider rst the term 
: For a given marginal cost cA;2, the monopoly
quantity Qm2 (cA;2) satises the FOC
P 02 (Q
m
2 (cA;2))Q
m
2 (cA;2) + P2 (Q
m
2 (cA;2))  cA;2 = 0:
Di¤erentiating this with respect to cA;2 leads to
dQm2
dcA;2
=
1
P 002 (Qm2 (cA;2))Qm2 (cA;2) + 2P 02 (Qm(cA;2))
:
9
From pm2 (cA;2) = P2(Q
m(cA;2)) it then follows that
dpm2
dcA;2
= P 02(Q
m
2 (cA;2))
dQm2
dcA;2
=
P 02 (Qm2 (cA;2))
P 002 (Qm2 (cA;2))Qm2 (cA;2) + 2P 02 (Qm(cA;2))
which yields dp
m
2
dcA;2
= 12+Em2
where Em2 =
P 002 (Qm2 (cA;2))Qm2 (cA;2)
P 02(Qm(cA;2))
. Thus, we get that 
 = 12+Em2
@fA
@qA;1
@fB
@qB;1
:
Let us now examine the terms
dqA;1
dS and
dqB;1
dS . Di¤erentiating q

i;1 (S) = Ri;1

q i;1 (S) ; S

with respect to S yields
dqi;1
dS
=
@Ri;1
@S
+
@Ri;1
@q i;1
dq i;1
dS
: (8)
Applying (8) to i and  i leads to
dqi;1
dS
=
@Ri;1
@S
+
@Ri;1
@q i;1

@R i;1
@S
+
@R i;1
@qi;1
dqi;1
dS

which yields
dqi;1
dS
=
@Ri;1
@S +
@Ri;1
@q i;1
@R i;1
@S
1  @Ri;1@q i;1
@R i;1
@qi;1
:
Computation of @Ri;1@S and
@Ri;1
@q i;1 . Firm is total discounted prot is given by
i (qi;1; q i;1; S) = (P1 (qi;1 + q i;1) + S   ci;1) qi;1 + i;2 (fi (ci;1; qi;1)) ; f i (c i;1; q i;1))
The FOC dening Ri;1(q i;1; S) is therefore given by
P 01 (q i;1 +Ri;1(q i;1; S))Ri;1(q i;1; S) + P1 (q i;1 +Ri;1(q i;1; S)) + S   ci;1 + (9)

@i;2
@ci;2
(fi (ci;1; Ri;1(q i;1; S)) ; f i (c i;1; q i;1))
@fi
@qi;1
(ci;1; Ri;1(q i;1; S)) = 0;
where i;2 (ci;2; c i;2) is rm is equilibrium prot in period 2 when it produces at marginal cost
ci;2 and its rival produces at marginal cost c i;2. Di¤erentiating (9) with respect to S leads to
@Ri;1
@S
=   1
P
00
1 Ri;1 + 2P
0
1 + 

@2i;2
@c2i;2

@fi
@qi;1
2
+
@i;2
@ci;2
@2fi
@q2i;1

Therefore, at the equilibrium we have
@Ri;1
@S
=   1
P 01
1
Ei;1 + 2 +

P 01

@2i;2
@c2i;2

@fi
@qi;1
2
+
@i;2
@ci;2
@2fi
@q2i;1
 :
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where Ei;1 =
P
00
1 (Qi;1)qi;1
P 01(Qi;1)
is the curvature of the (inverse) demand perceived by rm i at the
equilibrium.
Di¤erentiating (9) with respect to q i;1 yields
@Ri;1
@q i;1
=  
P
00
1 Ri;1 + P
0
1 + i
@2i;2
@ci;2@c i;2
@f i
@q i;1
@fi
@qi;1
P
00
1 Ri;1 + 2P
0
1 + 

@2i;2
@c2i;2

@fi
@qi;1
2
+
@i;2
@ci;2
@2fi
@q2i;1
 :
Then, at the equilibrium,
@Ri;1
@q i;1
=  
Ei;1 + 1 +

P 01
@2i;2
@ci;2@c i;2
@fi
@qi;1
@f i
@q i;1
Ei;1 + 2 +

P 01

@2i;2
@c2i;2

@fi
@qi;1
2
+
@i;2
@ci;2
@2fi
@q2i;1
 :
Sign of gA(S). From (3) it follows that
dqi;1
dS
=
1
2(1 2i )
  1+i i
2(1 2i )
 1
2(1 2 i)
1  (1+i i)
2
4(1 2i )(1 2 i)
=
1  22 i   i i
4
 
1  2i
  
1  2 i
   1 + i i2
For the equilibrium to be stable we need the slopes of the reaction curves to be less than 1 in
absolute value. This requires that
1+i i
2(1 2i )
< 1 for i = A;B, which can be rewritten as
2max
 
2A; 
2
B

+ AB < 1 (10)
This assumption implies that
dqi;1
dS > 0: Therefore, the sign of gA (S) is the same as the sign of
dqB;1
dS
dqA;1
dS
  A
2B
=
1  22A   AB
1  22B   AB
  A
2B
=
2B   A   32AB
2B
 
1  22B   AB
 :
Thus, using again (10) we get that
gA (S) < 0() B <
A
2  32A
 w (A) :
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